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ABSTRACT
Graph convolutional networks (GCNs) have been widely used for classifying
graph nodes in the semi-supervised setting. Previous work have shown that GCNs
are vulnerable to the perturbation on adjacency and feature matrices of existing
nodes. However, it is unrealistic to change existing nodes in many applications,
such as existing users in social networks. In this paper, we design algorithms to
attack GCNs by adding fake nodes. A greedy algorithm is proposed to generate
adjacency and feature matrices of fake nodes, aiming to minimize the classifica-
tion accuracy on the existing nodes. In addition, we introduce a discriminator to
classify fake nodes from real nodes, and propose a Greedy-GAN attack to simul-
taneously update the discriminator and the attacker, to make fake nodes indistin-
guishable to the real ones. Our non-targeted attack decreases the accuracy of GCN
down to 0.10, and our targeted attack reaches a success rate of 99% on the whole
datasets, and 94% on average for attacking a single target node.
1 INTRODUCTION
Graphs play a very important role in many real world applications, such as social networks (Face-
book and Twitter), biological networks (protein-protein interaction networks and gene interaction
networks), as well as attribute graphs (PubMed and Arxiv) (Grover & Leskovec, 2016; Ying et al.,
2018; Rhee et al., 2017). Node classification is one of the most important tasks on graphs—given
a graph with labels associated with a subset of nodes, predict the labels for rest of the nodes. For
this node classification task, deep learning models on graphs, such as Graph Convoltional Networks
(GCNs), have achieved state-of-the-art performance (Kipf & Welling, 2016). Moreover, GCNs
have wide applications in cyber security, where they can learn a close-to-correct node labeling semi-
autonomously. This reduces the load on security experts and helps to manage networks that add or
remove nodes dynamically, such as, WiFi networks in universities and web services in companies.
The wide applicability of GCNs motivates recent studies about their robustness. Zu¨gner et al. (2018)
Dai et al. (2018) develop algorithms to attack GCNs, showing that by altering a small amount of
edges and features, the classification accuracy of GCNs can be reduced to chance-level. However,
changing edges or features associated with existing nodes is impractical in many cases. For example,
in social network applications, an attacker has to login to the users’ accounts to change existing
connections and features, and gaining login accesses is almost impossible. In comparison, adding
fake nodes that correspond to fake accounts or users, can be much easier in practice. But the key
question is can we interfere the classification results of existing nodes by adding fake nodes to the
network? We answer this question affirmative by introducing novel algorithms to design fake nodes
that successfully reduce GCN’s performance on existing nodes.
To design the adjacency and feature matrices associated with fake nodes, we have to address two
challenges. First, the edges and features are usually discrete 0/1 variables. Although there have been
many algorithms proposed for attacking image classifiers, such as FGSM, C&W and PGD attacks
(Goodfellow et al., 2014; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Madry et al., 2017), they all assume continuous
input space and cannot be directly applied to problems with discrete input space. Second, it’s not
easy to make the fake nodes “look” like the real ones. For example, if we add a fake node that
connects to all existing nodes, the system can easily detect and disable such fake node. In this paper,
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we propose two algorithms, Greedy attack and Greedy-GAN attack, to address these two challenges.
Our contributions can be summarized below:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper studying how to add fake nodes to attack
GCNs. We do not need to manipulate existing nodes’ adjacency and feature matrices.
• We propose a Greedy attack algorithm to address the discrete input space problem in de-
signing fake nodes’ adjacency and feature matrices.
• We introduce a discriminator to classify fake nodes from real nodes, and propose a Greedy-
GAN algorithm to simultaneous optimize the discriminator and the attacker. Despite a
lower successful rate, this approach can make fake nodes harder to detect.
• We conduct experiments on several real datasets. For non-targeted attack, we get accuracy
down to 0.10 for the Cora dataset, and 0.14 for the Citeseer dataset. For targeted attack on
whole datasets, Greedy attack have up to 99% success rate on Cora and 90% on Citeseer.
For targeted attack on a single node, it could reach 94% success rate on Cora and 0.80%
success rate on Citeseer.
2 RELATED WORK
Adversarial Attacks Adversarial examples for computer vision tasks have been studied exten-
sively. Goodfellow et al. (2014) discovers that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial
attacks—a carefully designed small perturbation can easily fool a neural network. Several algo-
rithms have been proposed to generate adversarial examples for image classification tasks, including
FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014), IFGSM (Kurakin et al., 2016), C&W attack (Carlini & Wagner,
2017) and PGD attack (Madry et al., 2017). In the black-box setting, it has also been reported that
an attack algorithm can have high success rate using finite difference techniques (Chen et al., 2017b;
Cheng et al., 2018a), and several algorithms are recently proposed to reduce query numbers (Ilyas
et al., 2018; Suya et al., 2017). Transfer attack (Papernot et al., 2016a) and ensemble attack (Trame`r
et al., 2017) can also be applied to black-box setting, with lower successful rate but less number of
queries. Besides attacking image classification, CNN related attacks have also been explored. A
typical usage is attacking semantic segmentation and object detection (Metzen et al., 2017; Arnab
et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2017; Lu et al., 2017; Eykholt et al., 2017). Image captioning (Chen et al.,
2017a) and visual QA (Xu et al., 2017) could also be attacked.
Most of the above-mentioned work are focusing on problems with continuous input space (such as
images). When the input space is discrete, attacks become discrete optimization problems and are
much harder to solve. This happens in most natural language processing (NLP) applications. For
text classification problem, Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) is firstly applied by (Papernot et al.,
2016b). Deleting important words (Li et al., 2016), replacing or inserting words with typos and
synonyms (Samanta & Mehta, 2017; Liang et al., 2017). For black box setting, Gao et al. (2018)
develops score functions to find out the works to modify. Jia & Liang (2017) adds misleading
sentences to fool the reading comprehension system. Zhao et al. (2017) uses GAN to generate
natural adversarial examples. Ebrahimi et al. (2017) and Cheng et al. (2018b) attacks machine
translation system Seq2Seq by changing words in text.
Graph Convolutional Neural Networks (GCNs). Classification of graph nodes has become an
important problem in cyber security applications and recommender systems. Graph convolutional
networks (GCNs) solve the problem in an end-to-end manner and can avoid the ”optimize twice”
problem of previous graph embedding methods. The main idea of GCNs is to aggregate associated
information from a node and its neighbors using some aggregation functions. They train the aggre-
gation steps and the final prediction layer end-to-end to achieve better performance than traditional
approaches. There are several variations of GCNs proposed recently (Kipf & Welling, 2016; Pham
et al., 2016; Defferrard et al., 2016; Hamilton et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018; Ying et al., 2018), and
we will focus on the commonly used structure proposed in (Kipf & Welling, 2016).
There have been several work on attacking GCNs. Recently, Zu¨gner et al. (2018) publishes an
attack on GCNs by changing current nodes’ links and features. They present a FGSM-like method
and optimize a surrogate model named Nettack to choose the edges and features that should be
manipulated. Dai et al. (2018) shows that by only manipulating graph structure, the Graph Neural
2
Networks are quite vulnerable to the attacks of challenging few edges. They propose reinforcement
learning-based method to attack. They also employee a gradient ascent method to change the graph
structures in the white-box setting. Both of these two papers perform non-targeted attacks only.
Instead of altering edges or features of existing nodes, we develop novel algorithms to add fake nodes
to interfere the performance of GCNs. This has not been done in previous work. Furthermore, we
test our algorithm in both targeted and non-targeted attacks in the experiments.
3 PRELIMINARY
GCN is a semi-supervised learning method to classify nodes in a graph. Given an adjacency matrix
A ∈ Rn×n, feature matrix X ∈ Rn×d, and a subset of labeled nodes, the goal is to predict the labels
of all the nodes in the graph. We use n to denote number of nodes, L to denote number of labels,
and d to denote the dimension of features (each row of X corresponds to features for a node). There
are several variations of GCNs, but we consider one of the most common approaches introduced
in (Kipf & Welling, 2016). Starting from H0 = X , GCN uses the following rule to iteratively
aggregate features from neighborhoods:
H(l+1) = σ(D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2H(l)W (l)), (1)
where A˜ = A+ IN is the adjacency matrix of the undirected graph with added self connections, IN
is the identity matrix, D˜ is a diagonal matrix with D˜i,i =
∑
j A˜ij , and σ is the activation function.
We set σ(x) = ReLU(x) = max(0, x), which is the most common choice in practice. For a GCN
with L layers, after getting the top-layer feature HL, a fully connected layer with soft-max loss is
used for classification. A commonly used application is to apply two-layer GCN for semi-supervised
learning node classification on graph (Kipf & Welling, 2016). The model could be simplified as:
Z = softmax(Aˆσ(AˆXW (0))W (1)) := softmax(f(X,A)), (2)
where Aˆ = D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2 . Note that each row of f(X,A) ∈ Rn×L is the logit output for a node
over L labels, and the softmax is taken on each row of the matrix. Another choice for forming Aˆ is
to normalize the adjacency matrix by rows, leading to Aˆ = ˜D−1A˜. We will experience with both
choices in the experimental results.
For simplicity, we will assume our target network is structured as equation 2, but in general our
algorithm can be used to attack GCNs with more layers.
4 ATTACK ALGORITHMS
In this section, we will describe our “fake nodes” attack on GCNs. We will describe both a non-
targeted attack, which tries to lower the accuracy of all the existing nodes uniformly, and a targeted
attack, which attempts to force the GCN to give a desired label to nodes. Instead of manipulating
the feature and adjacency matrices of existing nodes, we insert m fake nodes with corresponding
fake features into the graph. After that, the adjacency matrix is A′ =
[
A BT
B C
]
and the feature
matrix becomes : X ′ =
[
X
Xfake
]
. Note that A is the original adjacency matrix and X is the original
feature matrix. Starting fromB = 0, C = I , our goal is to designB,C,Xfake to achieve the desired
objective (e.g., lower the classification accuracy on existing nodes).
4.1 NON-TARGETED ATTACK
The goal of non-targeted attack is to lower the classification accuracy on all the existing nodes by
designing features and links of fake nodes. We use the accuracy of GCN to measure the effectiveness
of attacks. We will present two different algorithms to attack GCNs: Greedy attack that updates links
and features one by one, and Greedy-GAN attack that uses a discriminator to generate unnoticeable
features of fake nodes.
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Algorithm 1 Greedy Attack
Input: Adjacency matrix A; feature matrix X; A classifier f with loss function J ; number of
iterations T .
Output: Modified graph and features G′ = (A′, X ′) after adding fake nodes.
for: t = 0 to T − 1 do
Let e∗ = (u∗, v∗)← argmax∇B,CJ(A′, X ′)
G
(t+1)
B,C ← G(t)B,C + e∗
Let f∗ = (u∗, i∗)← argmax∇XfakeJ(A′, X ′)
G
(t+1)
Xfake
← G(t)Xfake + f∗
return: G(t)
4.1.1 GREEDY ATTACK
In our attack, we define the objective function as
J(A′, X ′) =
∑
i=1,...,n
(
max
(
[f(X ′, A′)]i,:
)
− [f(X ′, A′)]i,yi
)
, (3)
where yi is the correct label of node i. In this objective function, if the largest logit of node i is not
the correct label yi, it will encounter a positive score; otherwise the score will be zero. We then try
to solve the following optimization problem to form the fake nodes:
argmax
B,C,Xfake
J(A′, X ′) s.t. ‖B‖0 + ‖C‖0 + ‖Xfake‖0 ≤ T, (4)
where ‖ · ‖0 denotes number of nonzero elements in the matrix. Also, we assume B,C,Xfake
can only be 0/1 matrices. Unlike images, graphs have discrete values in the adjacency matrix, and
in many applications the feature matrix comes from indicator of different categories. Therefore,
gradient-based techniques such as FGSM and PGD cannot be directly applied.
Instead, we propose a greedy approach—starting from B,C,Xfake all being zeros, we add
one feature and one edge at each step. To add a feature, we find the the maximum element
in ∇XfakeJ(A′, X ′) and turn it into nonzero. Similarly, we find the maximum element in
∇B,CJ(A′, X ′) and add the entry to the adjacency matrix. The Greedy attack is presented in Algo-
rithm 1.
In the algorithm, when adding links and features, we make sure that there is no such a link or feature
before adding. In practice, we can adjust the frequency of feature and weight updates. For example,
if the original adjacency matrix has twice nonzero elements than the feature matrix, we can update
two elements in the adjacency matrix and one element in the feature matrix at every iteration.
4.1.2 GREEDY-GAN ATTACK
Next we will present the attack based on the idea of Generative Adversarial Network (GAN). The
main idea is to add a discriminator to generate fake features that are similar to the original ones. In
order to do this, we first design a neural network with two fully connected layers plus a softmax
layer as the discriminator, which can be written as
D(X ′) = softmax(σ(X ′W (0))W (1)), (5)
where softmax works on each row of the output matrix. Each element in D(X ′) indicates whether
the discriminator classifies the node as real or fake.
We want to generate fake nodes with features similar to the real ones to fool the discriminator.
Since the output of discriminator is binary, we use binary cross entropy loss defined by L(p, y) =
−(y log(p)+(1−y) log(1−p)), where y is binary indicator of the ground-truth (real or fake images),
and p is the predicted probability by our discriminator. Then we solve the following optimization
problem :
argmax
B,C,Xfake
min
D
(J(A′, X ′)− c ∗ L(D(X ′), Y )), (6)
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Algorithm 2 Greedy-GAN Attack
Input: Adjacency matrix A; feature matrix X; A classifier f with loss function J ; Discriminator
D with loss function L; number of iterations T .
Output: Modified graph G′ = (A′, X ′) after adding fake nodes.
for: t = 0 to T − 1 do
if t%10000 == 0:
retrain discriminator D 10 times.
Let e∗add = (u
∗
add, v
∗
add)← argmax∇B,C [J(A′, X ′)− c ∗ L(D(X ′))]
e∗drop = (u
∗
drop, v
∗
drop)← argmin∇B,C [J(A′, X ′)− c ∗ L(D(X ′))]
if |∇B,C [J(A′, X ′)− c ∗ L(D(X ′))]e∗add | > |∇B,C [J(A′, X ′)− c ∗ L(D(X ′))]e∗drop | :
G
(t+1)
B,C ← G(t)B,C + e∗add
else:
G
(t+1)
B,C ← G(t)B,C − e∗drop
Let f∗add = (u∗add, i∗add)← argmax∇Xfake [J(A′, X ′)− c ∗ L(D(X ′))
f∗drop = (u
∗
drop, i
∗
drop)← argmin∇Xfake [J(A′, X ′)− c ∗ L(D(X ′))]
if |∇Xfake [J(A′, X ′)− c ∗ L(D(X ′))]f∗add | > |∇Xfake [J(A′, X ′)− c ∗ L(D((X ′))]f∗drop | :
G
(t+1)
Xfake
← G(t)Xfake + f∗add
else:
G
(t+1)
Xfake
← G(t)Xfake − f∗drop
return: G(t)
where Y is the ground-truth (real/fake) indicator for nodes and c is the parameter determine with the
weight of discriminator and the GCN performance. For example, if c is set with a very large value,
the objective function is dominated by the discriminator, so the node features generated will be very
close to real but with lower attack successful rate.
We adopt the GAN-like framework to train both features/adjacency matrices and discriminator
parameters iteratively. In experiments, at each epoch we conduct 10, 000 greedy updates for
B,C,Xfake and then 10 iterations of D updates. The Greedy-GAN algorithm is given as Algo-
rithm 2. Greedy-GAN supports both adding and dropping links and features. In the algorithm, we
add or drop elements according to the absolute gradient of elements, and the one with larger absolute
value will be chosen.
4.2 TARGETED ATTACK
Next we extend the proposed algorithms to conduct targeted attacks on GCNs. Given an adjacency
matrix and a feature matrix, the goal is to make nodes to be classified as a desired class by manipu-
lating links and features of fake nodes.
Assume our goal is to attack a subset of nodes S and y∗i is the target label for node i. We then define
the objective function as: In targeted attack, we define the objection function as:
J(A′, X ′) =
∑
i∈S
(
[f(X ′, A′)]i,y∗i −max
(
[f(X ′, A′)]i,:
))
, (7)
In this objective function, if largest logit of node i is the target label y∗i , the objective value is 0 ;
otherwise the value is negative. Similar to the non-targeted attack method, we would like to find B,
C and Xfake using Greedy attack to solve the optimization problem (4) and Greedy-GAN attack to
solve the optimization problem (6).
In our experiments, we will consider two cases: attacking the whole dataset (S = {1, . . . , n}) and
attacking one node (only one element in S). For attacking the whole dataset, the fake nodes labels
are given by a uniform distribution, which is the same as in the non-targeted attack setting. For
attacking a single target node, we add three fake nodes with target labels.
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Table 1: Accuracy of GCN before and after non-targeted attacks. Note that the final two rows are the
F1 score of the discriminator—lower values indicate that added fake nodes are harder to be detected.
Dataset Cora Citeseer
Normalization row-wise symmetric row-wise symmetric
Clean 0.84 0.81 0.76 0.73
Random 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.31
Greedy 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.14
Greedy-GAN 0.12 0.34 0.25 0.36
F1 score for Greedy 0.65 0.75 0.83 0.72
F1 score for Greedy-GAN 0.40 0.46 0.53 0.24
Table 2: Success rate for targeted attacks on the whole graph.
Dataset Cora Citeseer
Normalization row-wise symmetric row-wise symmetric
Greedy 0.99 0.97 0.90 0.85
Greedy-GAN 0.64 0.44 0.45 0.22
5 EXPERIMENTS
We use Cora and Citeseer attribute graphs as benchmarks, with a 20% / 80% labeled / unlabeled
split of the data. We add some fake nodes with corresponding fake feature matrix, and the rate
of fake labels, to investigate the influences on the results . The default number of fake nodes
we add is 20% of real nodes, and 25% percent of fake nodes have labels. In the initial state, the
fake nodes have random features only, and no connection to any other node. We then run our
attack algorithms to iteartively refine the feature and links of fake nodes. The results are shown in
GCN classification accuracy for non-targeted attacks, and success rate for targeted attacks. Lower
classification accuracy or higher success rate indicates more effective attacks.
5.1 NON-TARGETED ATTACK
We compare the effectiveness of random, Greedy algorithm, and Greedy-GAN algorithm in attack-
ing a given GCN. Table 1 shows the accuracy before and after non-targeted attacks. We can see that
both Greedy and Greedy-GAN methods work with row-wise and symmetric normalization on the
adjacency matrix. Greedy reduces the classification accuracy further than Greedy-GAN, because
Greedy-GAN generates features of nodes closer to the real nodes, and leads to lost in attacking per-
formance. We train a discriminator using randomly generated nodes, then feed it with fake features
generated by Greedy and Greedy-GAN algorithms. The F1 scores of the discriminators shows that
it is much harder to differentiate the features of a node between real and fake nodes under attacks by
Greedy-GAN, as compared to Greedy.
5.2 TARGETED ATTACK
A targeted attack tries to force the GCN to classify nodes to a certain class. We perform two different
experiments for targeted attacks: (1) attack the whole dataset; (2) attack only a single node.
When attacking the whole dataset, we randomly select a class, and other settings are the same as
non-targeted attacks. Table 2 shows that targeted attacks work for both Greedy and Greedy-GAN
algorithms. For Greedy attack, we can achieve very high success rate (usually > 90%), while
Greedy-GAN will make fake nodes indistinguishable from real ones.
Table 3: Success rate for targeted attacks on a single node.
Dataset Cora Citeseer
Normalization row-wise symmetric row-wise symmetric
Greedy 0.94 0.83 0.80 0.62
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Table 4: Accuracy under Greedy attack, for nodes with different degrees; Cora Dataset with sym-
metric normalization.
nodes degree (0,5] (5,10] (10,20] (20,∞)
clean 0.82 0.85 0.87 0.75
Greedy 0.13 0.25 0.37 0.5
Figure 1: Accuracy of GCN by attacking fea-
tures, edges or both, with Cora dataset.
Figure 2: Accuracy of GCN using row-wise or
symmetrical normalization, with Cora dataset.
When attacking only a single node, we add three fake nodes with target labels. Table 3 shows the
average success rate of attacking one node is very high. Due to the tiny number of nodes added,
the change in distributions of labels is unnoticeable. In our experiments, we add 13 edges and 10
features per fake nodes on average. We did not perform Greedy-GAN attack, because the numbers
of real and fake nodes are so unbalanced that over fitting will make the discriminator inaccurate.
We notice that attacking nodes to certain target classes are more difficult than others. For example,
if the target class is class 0 (249 nodes) from Citeseer dataset (3312 nodes in 6 classes), targeted
attack has a lower successful rate. The reason might be that there are less nodes with class 0, so the
attacked nodes only have weak linkage to class 0 nodes, and the classification is more influenced by
nodes in other classes. This makes it harder to turn the predicted label to class 0 when only adding
three fake nodes.
5.3 PARAMETER SENSITIVITY
Degree of Nodes. As shown in Table 4, nodes with smaller degrees are easier to attack, i.e. produce
a different classification from the original one. When adding extra links between fake nodes and real
nodes, higher degree nodes are more resistant to the impact of fake nodes.
Features vs. Edges. We want to know which is more important in influencing the output of
the GCN: modifying features or modifying edges. In this experiment, we randomly initialize some
edges and features for the fake nodes, then update either features or edges, while keeping the other
one fixed. Figure 1 shows that modifying features have a minor effect on the classification accuracy,
and the attack becomes less effective under too many feature modifications. Edges play a more
significant role for attacking. This insight inspires us to use a GAN to generate fake nodes and
features.
Row-wise vs. Symmetrical Normalization. We found that the implementations of GCNs may
differ by frameworks in how they normalize the adjacency matrix. The Pytorch code normalizes the
adjacency matrix by row Aˆ = D−1(A+ I), while the TensorFlow code normalizes it symmetrically
Aˆ = D−1/2(A+I)D−1/2. They are both correct as claimed by the authors, and this is an ambiguous
point in the definition of GCNs in general.
In this experiment, a fixed amount of fake data are added per iteration, i.e. more iterations means
more fake data. Figure 2 shows that the performance of these two approaches are similar when
training a ”clean” GCN with small amount of attack; However, under stronger attacks with larger
number of fake nodes, the symmetric scaling version is more robust.
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Figure 3: Accuracy of GCN under evasion or
poisoning attacks, with Citeseer dataset.
Figure 4: Accuracy of GCN using different
percentage of fake nodes, with Cora dataset.
Table 5: Accuracy of GCN under non-attacks by Greedy and Greedy-GAN, with different label rates
and Cora dataset.
label rate 0% 5 % 10 % 15 % 20 %
Greedy 0.08 0.10 0.18 0.21 0.23
Greedy-GAN 0.33 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.16
Evasion vs Poisoning. In industry, GCN is normally used with longitudinal data. Training a
new network is time consuming, and changes between updates are not significant, thus people just
retrain the network after certain amount of time. We thus consider the scenario where the GCN is
re-trained under the dataset with fake nodes. This is also known as the data poisoning attack, while
the previous discussed scenario that attacking a target model without retraining is called the evasion
attack. Figure 3 shows the difference in classification accuracy under evasion or poisoning attack.
The GCN is retained with learning rate 0.01, 50 epochs after the data has been modified. We run
GCN with different random seeds and plot the error bars. The results show that both evasion and
poisoning can effectively reduce the accuracy of GCN, and the symmetric normalization is more
robust under poisoning attacks.
Number of Fake Nodes. Figure 4 shows how the number of fake nodes influences the classification
accuracy. We use 2.5%, 5%, 10% and 20% of fake nodes, and assign random labels to the fake
nodes. As expected, more fake nodes yields more effective attacks, for both evasion and poisoning.
We notice that with 20 % of fake nodes and all nodes labeled, the attack has lower effectiveness than
the default setting with 20 % fake nodes and 5 % labeled. We will talk about this in the next section.
Label Rate. We discuss the effect of different label rates of fake nodes. In Table 5, we keep the
percentage of fake nodes to 20%, and change the percentage of labeled nodes from 0% to 20%.
Intuitively we thought that a higher label rate will lead to a larger impact in GCN’s accuracy. How-
ever, it turns out that when the label rate is 0%, non-targeted attack (Greedy) has the largest effect.
We suspect the reason may be that when the label rate is 0, i.e. not considering the features matrix,
multiple edges might be viewed as adding edges for the existing nodes in the graph. It is also true
that for targeted attack; for example, if we give all the fake nodes random labels for the Citeseer
dataset and use a symmetric normalized adjacency matrix, the targeted attack success rate is 0.81,
compared to 0.85 when with label as shown in Table 2. For attack by Greedy-GAN, a different pat-
tern is observed. Using 0 label rate yields the least effect, and from 5% to 20%, the result is similar
to what we find using Greedy.
6 CONCLUSION
We present two algorithms, Greedy and Greedy-GAN, on adversarial attacks of GCNs by adding
fake nodes, without changing any existing edges or features, for both non-targeted and targeted at-
tacks. We successfully attacked existing GCN implementations, and explored parameter sensitives,
such as number of fake nodes and different label rates of fake nodes. To make the attack unnotice-
able, we added a discriminator using the Greedy-GAN algorithm to generate features of fake nodes.
We noticed that data cleaning before training is crucial, and adding a discriminator makes the impact
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of attacks weaker. There is a trade-off between the efficiency of attack and realness of fake nodes’
features.
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